DEEP PRESS ANALYSIS

The surge of interest in hedge funds isn't about "love for alpha," but an institutional reaction to a regime of heightened uncertainty where passive beta offers inferior risk control. Winners of 2025 earn the right to hike fees and tighten terms, redistributing returns from LPs to GPs. For pension and endowment money, the key motive is diversification away from overheated megacap indices and the "single-scenario" risk of the AI rally. The return of capital amplifies systemic effects: funds begin to "make the market" in specific sectors, increasing correlations within themes while severing them between themes. Concurrently, the role of macro and FX strategies is growing because policy and tariffs are turning into sources of volatility. This benefits major platforms, prime brokers, and exchange infrastructure but increases fragility during sharp liquidity reversals. The risk for markets lies in concentration within identical "hot" positions and forced selling during stress-induced margin calls. For regulators, this signals a return to a model where opaque leverage is regaining weight. For corporations, this means more aggressive activism and growing M&A pressure via equity and credit. For the private investor, the indirect effect is rising liquidity premiums and choppier index dynamics on days with geopolitical news.

The market is demonstrating a new habit: political noise is sold first, then bought back, because participants believe damage will be localized. This "muscle memory" benefits market makers and short-term strategies but raises the risk of a sudden collapse when the buy-back stops working. Tariff threats and diplomatic skirmishes are becoming negotiation tools rather than exceptions, widening ranges and increasing hedging costs. The US gains short-term leverage but pays via a rising "sovereign premium" in the cost of capital during prolonged conflicts with allies. For Europe and Canada, the signal is clear: dependence on the US market no longer guarantees political predictability. For the dollar, the key test is this: if it stops being the automatic beneficiary of stress, gold, "table neighbors," and defense stocks enter the game. This pulls flows from growth to value/defense and increases return dispersion. The risk for the corporate sector is deteriorating refinancing conditions if volatility becomes entrenched in rates and credit spreads. The geopolitical factor is beginning to compete with inflation for the role of the main driver. In such conditions, profit forecasting becomes less central than access to liquidity and the ability to rapidly shift supply chains.

The trend toward strengthening executive power benefits the White House because it allows converting tempo into results without forming long coalitions. For legislators, incentives are reversed: the political risk of voting is high, and it is convenient to dilute responsibility, leaving a "gray zone" of authority. The more conflicts take hybrid forms, the easier it is for the administration to bypass formal restrictions by substituting "war" with "operations" and "security assurance." For markets, this provides a short-term illusion of manageability: decisions are made quickly, uncertainty seemingly drops. Long-term, this raises the risk of policy whipsaws, as course stability depends on a single decision-making center and a single electoral cycle. Allies receive a signal that agreements can change without a parliamentary "anchor," and start hedging through defense and trade diversification. For adversaries, this opens a window to test red lines through provocations, where the response will be non-institutional and thus less predictable. Investors are pricing in a higher political risk premium in defense, energy, and infrastructure sectors. An additional effect is the growth of judicial and constitutional conflicts within the US, amplifying regulatory uncertainty. Ultimately, the question isn't "legality," but the cost of capital in a country where foreign policy increasingly turns into a tool of domestic politics.

The conflict surrounding the "small power resistance model" is a struggle for the right to set rules in an era of economic coercion. For Canada, the stake is sovereignty in trade and tech policy while maintaining access to the largest market. For the US administration, it is beneficial to frame this as a loyalty issue to discipline allies and increase negotiation asymmetry. For China, such friction is a chance to expand deals with US partners and fracture the united front. Markets read this as a risk of revising capital and trade chains in North America, especially if the dispute transitions into tariff and sanctions instruments. The Canadian signal to investors: the country is trying to position itself as a "smart hedge" between blocks, but will have to pay for this with short-term volatility. The American signal: Washington is ready to use economic power even against friends if it yields a domestic political dividend. This increases demand for political insurance in corporate strategies—from production localization to dual legal structures. For commodity markets and energy, the risk of "infrastructure" retaliatory measures hitting logistics and long-term contracts is significant. In geopolitics, this accelerates the trend toward "coalitions of interest," where values are replaced by deals. The ultimate hidden logic is not a clash of leaders, but a test of the limits of permissible pressure within the Western bloc.

Business is being dragged into politics not due to morality, but due to operational risks: hiring, retention, and reputation in local communities are becoming part of the P&L. For federal power, pressure on the migration agenda is a way to show "control" and mobilize the electorate, shifting costs onto companies and cities. For corporations, silence is often rational, but now it can be perceived as consent, raising the risk of boycotts and talent outflow. Inside companies, the role of internal communications and compliance is growing because personnel demand behavioral rules and protection on the ground. The risk is not just PR, but legal liabilities, including interaction with law enforcement and employee data protection. For investors, this manifests as growth in "social volatility" in valuation: the premium for management stability increases, especially in consumer brands and healthcare. Beneficiaries are risk consultants, security providers, and law firms; losers are those dependent on stable cheap labor. In a broader contour, this signals a decline in "business neutrality" in the US: Corporate America is becoming a political actor again, albeit unwillingly. Geopolitically, this weakens the US appeal as an "apolitical haven" for talent if migration policy becomes unpredictable. In labor markets, this may accelerate automation and the offshoring of functions to regions with less regulatory noise.

The market is getting used to political risk becoming part of daily pricing rather than a "tail event." The "create chaos—get a deal" tactic benefits negotiations but is expensive for the cost of capital because it raises volatility and the risk premium. For the administration, the short-term benefit is a show of force and quick concessions from partners, especially in tariff plots. For Europe and allies, this signals the need for insurance against American unpredictability through diversification of reserves and defense procurement. A key market marker is the absence of an automatic dollar rally during stress episodes, changing the structure of "safe havens." Flows shift to gold and defense stocks, amplifying sectoral skews. The US depends on external deficit financing, so any creditor doubts quickly turn into market leverage against Washington. It is beneficial for Europe to remind everyone of its role as a major holder of US assets, but this same position makes it vulnerable to financial losses during escalation. For investors, strategy becomes more tactical: less "buy and hold," more hedges and rotations. The risk of 2026 is not an instantaneous crash, but the accumulation of distrust, which gradually raises the required yield on all US asset classes. In such an environment, liquidity and risk limit discipline win, not faith in quick reversals after every political tweet.

The "patent cliff" is a redistribution of rent from originators to insurers, generics, and biosimilars. Companies with strong cash flow try to buy time through M&A, buybacks, and expanding indications for existing drugs. This benefits investment banks and activists because deal growth raises fees and opens opportunities to pressure management. For regulators and society, the risk is that pharma will hold prices and protect IP more aggressively, intensifying the political conflict around treatment costs. For the equity market, the key is not "quality of science," but a company's ability to convert R&D into a commercial pipeline before patents expire. Vulnerable are those with revenue concentration in a few molecules and a weak late-stage pipeline. Relative winners are platforms with scalable development technologies and data access, as well as device makers tied to chronic therapies. In the credit market, this manifests in widening spreads for issuers with risky deals, even if ratings hold for now. Management's hidden motive is to preserve multiples through "financial engineering," but the market increasingly demands proof of real growth. The geopolitical layer is dependence on global ingredient and production chains, where any tariff conflict hits margins instantly. The final logic: pharma is entering a cycle where capitalization is determined not by current profit, but by the quality of filling future revenue holes.

The transition to AI agents makes attacks more scalable because bad actors automate reconnaissance, phishing, and vulnerability exploitation. This benefits cyber-vendors selling "autonomous protection" but raises competition between platforms and niche solutions. For large corporations, the risk is not in the "hack," but in the continuous growth of operational security expenses and rising insurance premiums. An institutionally important shift: responsibility moves to the board level because incidents become material for reporting and regulatory requirements. The market will start repricing companies based on security process maturity, just as it previously repriced based on cloud or ESG. Parallelly, the balance of power changes: cloud providers gain more influence as control over the execution environment becomes key. For states, this is also a tool: agentic systems lower the threshold for cyber operations, expanding the gray zone of conflict. In the labor market, there is a growing deficit of specialists capable of managing not just tools, but autonomous response systems. For investors, it is important to track who will "collect the rent"—endpoint, identity, cloud platforms, or data/telemetry providers. The bubble risk exists if companies sell promises of "AI protection" without measurable damage reduction indicators. Hidden logic: cybersecurity is becoming an infrastructure industry where the winner is the one embedded in business processes, not the one with the flashiest tech.

Simplifying access to the muni primary market is a struggle by intermediaries for commission income and retaining wealthy clients. Issuers are interested in expanding the buyer base because it lowers borrowing costs and reduces dependence on large dealers. For the investor, the primary market is attractive due to a "cleaner" deal structure and potentially better pricing, but the risk lies in weak post-issuance liquidity. Under conditions of political volatility, investors seek tax efficiency, and munis become an alternative to corporate credit for the upper income segment. However, municipal credit risk is beginning to depend more strongly on population migration, climate, and federal transfers. This means "safety" here is increasingly less universal: qualitative issuer analysis is more important than the general rate trend. For the market as a whole, growing retail participation may increase sensitivity to news and cause accelerated sell-offs during stress episodes. Intermediaries will promote "packaged" solutions and platforms, increasing standardization but lowering risk profile personalization. Geopolitically, direct impact is limited, but through the federal budget and infrastructure priorities, credit quality distribution across states and cities changes. The hidden motive is monetizing data and order flow in the primary market, where platforms with better allocation distribution win. Conclusion: munis are becoming more "market-like," and thus more volatile than conservative investors are used to thinking.

The meme episode wasn't about a single stock, but about redistributing power between retail, brokers, market makers, and regulators. Platform trading proved that attention coordination can temporarily defeat fundamentals, creating risk for short strategies and prime brokers. For brokers, the benefit was client base growth and order flow, but the cost was regulatory pressure and margin buffer requirements. For capital markets, the signal is: liquidity can be "social" rather than financial, and thus vanish as quickly as it appears. Institutional investors have started evaluating "crowded shorts" risk and reputational risks of conflicts with retail differently. Companies saw that attention can be monetized through secondary offerings and restructuring if the window is caught. Regulators, by tightening rules, try to lower recurrence probability, but completely removing incentives is impossible while the "lottery yield" incentive is built into interfaces. Geopolitically, the effect is indirect: trust in US markets as the "most rational" takes cracks, fueling interest in alternative venues and assets. In company valuation, the role of "narrative" grows, especially in tech and consumer segments. Hidden logic: the meme revolution cemented a model where price is simultaneously capital and a media event, and expectation management has become part of financial strategy.

The story of GaN microchips is not about science, but about sovereignty in dual-use supply chains. When access to technology is closed, domestic development becomes a way to lower external vulnerability and raise negotiating leverage. For the state, this is beneficial: investments in defense electronics create a multiplier for civilian applications and local industry. For partners and competitors, the signal is that India wants to be a technological node, not a sales market, and will protect this trajectory with protectionist measures. For markets, this means growing appeal for the Indian deeptech sector, materials, and defense contractors. The risk is "showcase" projects where lab success doesn't transition to scaling, and budget support creates dependency. An additional risk is retaliatory restrictions on equipment and software if India's success is perceived as a threat to the technological balance. Geopolitically, GaN strengthens radar and comms capabilities, changing regional military math and deterrence. This pushes neighbors to accelerate their own programs and procurement, intensifying the Indo-Pacific race. For investors, the indicator is whether export contracts and production standardization will emerge, or if everything stays within the "national circuit." Hidden logic: India converts external denial into an argument for internal mobilization and industrial policy.

Any "peace" architecture dominated by the US often implies transactionalism and exchanging concessions for short-term stability. For India, the risk is that others' agreements fix regional balances without accounting for Indian priorities—from energy to diaspora and trade routes. For Washington, such initiatives are beneficial as a tool to redistribute attention and resources, especially if the US wants to free its hands for other theaters. For regional players, this is a signal: rules can be rewritten quickly, meaning autonomy must be built in advance. On the other hand, the window of opportunity for India is to position itself as a pragmatic mediator and supplier of "non-ideological" solutions, raising diplomatic capital. Markets will react via risk premiums on oil, insurance, and logistics because "peace plans" change expectations on sanctions and supplies. The institutional risk is that if mechanisms turn out to be personalist, their sustainability depends on ratings and US electoral cycles. For Indian business, it is important to understand: access to Gulf markets and Red Sea routes depends on how much the "board" lowers escalation probability. Beneficiaries are defense and infrastructure contractors if "peace" means reformatting security guarantees. Losers are those betting on the former status quo and ignoring new bargaining terms. Hidden logic: India needs not to support or reject, but to integrate in a way that reduces asymmetry and gains leverage in case initiatives fail.

Greenland is becoming a symbol: the dispute isn't about land, but about whether the US can coerce allies on territory and security issues. For Washington, it is beneficial to use the topic as a pressure tool on Europe regarding defense spending and trade concessions. For Europe, the risk is existential: if territorial loyalty within the bloc is conditional, deterrence loses credibility. For markets, this is expressed in doubts about the "indisputable" status of US assets as a haven, especially if European holders start reducing exposure. Demand for gold and defense paper grows, as well as for local European autonomy projects. For Russia and China, this is a window for information and diplomatic operations to dilute Western unity. Institutionally, NATO faces a problem: the collective defense mechanism assumes a common political will, not trading obligations. Inside the US, the conflict is useful as a tool of internal mobilization, but it transfers internal polarization to foreign policy. For small nations, the lesson is simple: dependence on a single guarantor raises the risk of coercion. For India, this means the need to plan security without assuming NATO is monolithic and the Western order "eternal." Hidden logic: the Greenland topic is used as a test of limits—how far one can go without losing financial support and alliance infrastructure.

If the US shifts to "spheres of influence" logic, the security vacuum is inevitably filled by more active regional players. For China, this is beneficial: the less US presence, the higher the price of neighbors' concessions and the easier it is to push economic and military terms. For US allies, the risk is that guarantees become a subject of bargaining—"pay more, concede more," deteriorating predictability. India in this configuration is forced to balance between strengthening partnerships and maintaining strategic autonomy so as not to become the "frontier" of someone else's strategy. Markets in Asia will be sensitive to any signals about maritime incidents and sanctions regimes because they hit supply chains directly. The internal logic of regional countries is accelerating defense budgets and localizing critical industries. This will support the defense sector and infrastructure but increase fiscal risks and pressure on currencies. For China, the temptation grows to act in the "gray zone"—assertive enough to change the status quo, but not enough to provoke a collective response. For the US, the risk is reputational: losing ally trust is more expensive than short-term resource savings. For investors, the key is the ability of regional countries to create compatible coalitions rather than depending on one capital. Hidden logic: this is a transition from a rules-based order to a capability-based order, where the cost of security again becomes an explicit budget line item.

Using a mass cultural symbol lowers the barrier to entry: protest becomes "native" and viral, requiring no party organization. For authorities, this is a risk because traditional control methods—banning leaders, pressuring NGOs—work worse against memetic movements. For opposition actors, this is beneficial: discontent can be mobilized without revealing a command center and creating vulnerable structures. For markets, the direct effect is limited, but the political premium grows in countries with young populations and high digital connectivity. States can respond either with repression or attempted co-optation, and both scenarios affect the investment climate. Repression raises the risk of sanctions and capital flight, co-optation raises the risk of unpredictable populist spending. Business faces a new reality: reputational risks arise faster than legal ones and require reaction in "social media" mode. Internationally, this strengthens the "exportability" of protest tactics, reducing the uniqueness of local political crises. For tech platforms, this is a dual risk: growth of influence and simultaneous growth of regulatory pressure. Hidden logic: politics becomes an interface, and symbols and platforms fulfill the role of infrastructure, just as parties and unions did before.

The succession topic in the BJP is about managing "post-charisma" risk, when the party is strong but dependence on a single center remains high. For leadership, it is beneficial to prepare a new generation so as not to destroy the existing hierarchy and provoke factional wars. For coalition allies, this means growth in their negotiating power: the more the party needs stability, the more expensive support becomes. For markets, political continuity is important as a guarantee of budget predictability, privatization, and infrastructure programs. The risk is a conflict between the "old guard" and new managers, where competition may manifest through cadre purges and priority shifts. The internal motive is to preserve machine discipline while refreshing the face without ceding control. Regional elections become a test: weak states require local alliances and cultural adaptation, not a universal brand. This increases the probability of more pragmatic politics and deals at the state level, which investors usually welcome. But pragmatism also means rising transaction costs—more compromises, more rent distribution. Geopolitically, a strong and stable BJP raises India's ability to conduct a multi-vector foreign policy without internal disruptions. Hidden logic: the party is selling "continuity" to markets while rebuilding the system for the next power cycle.

Softening a public image isn't about empathy, but about expanding the electoral coalition beyond the core supporter base. For a regional leader, it is beneficial to show administrative efficiency without constant confrontational rhetoric to become acceptable to centrists and business. Video virality lowers communication costs and bypasses traditional media filters, strengthening the personal brand. For opponents, the risk is that criticism of "hardness" stops working if the image becomes more quotidian and "human." For UP markets, the signal of stability is key: if the leader shifts to a "managerial" frame, the probability of predictable decisions on infrastructure and regulations rises. Simultaneously, the risk remains that the soft image is just packaging, while the administrative practice of strict control persists, maintaining legal risks. The center's internal motive is to keep strong regional figures within the general strategy, not allowing them to become autonomous poles. Therefore, public "softness" may be a way to lower anxiety in elites about ambitions. For business, the key is not the clips, but execution quality: land issues, permits, law enforcement. Hidden logic: this is preparation for a higher role where not only ideological mobilization is required, but also the trust of moderate groups.

The emphasis on skills is an admission of a bottleneck: demographics offer a chance, but without qualification, it turns into unemployment and social pressure. For the government, it is beneficial to shift focus from purely infrastructure showcases to human capital because that is what supports productivity and the tax base. For industry, this signals potential subsidies, partnerships, and training standardization, creating a market for edtech and corporate training. The risk is bureaucratization and "reporting for reporting's sake," where money is absorbed but employment doesn't grow. For labor markets, it matters whether programs can really link training to supply chain and export needs. Coalition politics reinforces pragmatism: states need jobs, and skills become political currency. Geopolitically, this strengthens India's position as an alternative manufacturing hub amidst chain redistribution from China. For investors in India, this potentially lowers the risk of wage overheating and competence deficits, but the effect will lag. Hidden logic: the government is insuring social stability and competitiveness simultaneously, using "skills" as a bridge between growth and political sustainability.

A model where local communities manage ecotourism lowers the risk of conflict between nature conservation and economic growth. For regional authorities, this is beneficial: policy legitimacy grows when rules look like an extension of local practice rather than external imposition. For business, this creates a more sustainable product—tourism with "history" that can command a premium price. The risk is over-commercialization, when the tourist flow destroys exactly what is sold as "pristine." An important market signal: youth see income in the model and stay in the region, reducing migration pressure on cities. For investors, this is an "impact economy" case where return is built on sustainability and resource management. Geopolitically, the effect is subtle but important: such models increase the resilience of border and sensitive regions through employment and local loyalty. The institutional risk is dependence on grants and shifting political priorities; sustainability requires commercial discipline. For the national agenda, this is a demonstration that "grassroots" institutions can complement the state where it has weak executive capacity. Hidden logic: this is the creation of a managed alternative to mass tourism, which brings fast money but leaves long ecological liabilities.

Promoting "last mile" stories is a tool for building trust in institutions through concrete, measurable changes in people's lives. For the state and large capital, it is beneficial to show working models that can be scaled without constant subsidization. For regions, such programs mean lowering energy poverty and growing female participation in the economy, changing the social structure. Markets read this as a signal: the India growth story is trying to become more inclusive, lowering the risk of social backlash. However, there is a hidden risk—"window dressing": the success of individual cases may mask systemic infrastructure problems. For infrastructure and renewables investors, this supports the thesis of long-term demand for distributed energy and service models. For external audiences, this is soft power: India demonstrates an "exportable" development model, raising political capital in the Global South. Institutionally, beneficiaries are NGO platforms and partners who gain access to funding and networks. But sustainability depends on the quality of training and service maintenance on the ground, otherwise, the effect degrades quickly. Hidden logic: this is an attempt to tie the national success narrative to human capital, not just megaprojects and macro numbers.

The cover framing about "dissent" signals that the main conflict is shifting to the plane of legitimacy and control, not party competition. For power, it is beneficial to expand security threat interpretations because it lowers the cost of suppressing opposition and activism. For opposition and civil society, the risk is the normalization of exceptional measures and the washing out of space for legal criticism. For markets, this raises the institutional premium: investors downgrade predictability of law enforcement and court independence. The state's internal motive is to manage the tempo of social change, especially when the economic agenda requires unpopular decisions. Tightening the climate for dissent benefits the bureaucracy and security apparatus, expanding their influence and budgets. But this also increases the probability of "sudden" outbreaks of discontent because legal channels for venting steam are blocked. Corporations find themselves between compliance requirements and employee expectations, amplifying internal risks and reputational costs. Geopolitically, strengthening the anti-terror frame often complicates relations with democratic partners but may facilitate pragmatic deals with those who value control. Hidden logic: creating a long-term chilling effect where fear becomes cheaper than constant mass repression. This changes the investment picture: what matters is not growth, but institutional resilience and property rights protection in a conflict environment.

Preventive detention is convenient because it shifts the burden of proof from the state to the individual and stretches time as punishment. For power, this is beneficial given low judicial throughput: the system is overloaded, and detention becomes a substitute for a verdict. For rights defenders, the risk is the erosion of "due process" standards, which is hard to roll back even with a regime change. For markets, the quality of institutional guarantees deteriorates: if the law is applied broadly, regulatory risk for business and media grows. The hidden motive is not just control, but a signal to elites about discipline: rules are set by the center, not public discussion. Such a construct lowers the probability of organized opposition but raises the probability of radicalization because moderate forms of participation are marginalized. Corporations are forced to strengthen legal departments and risk policy, especially in data, content, and education spheres. Internationally, this creates reputational costs and may affect access to Western capital in sensitive sectors, though flows usually don't stop completely. Domestically, this redistributes power to security institutions, changing the influence balance in budgets and personnel appointments. For the investor, the key question is predictability: how selective is the mechanism and can it be "insured" via compliance. Hidden logic: institutionalization of the exception as a norm that outlives specific governments.

Personal testimonies from detention act as an alternative channel of legitimacy, especially when public space is limited. For the author and supporters, it is a way to turn an individual story into a collective argument against the system. For the state, the risk is that the emotionally neutral, "documentary" tone of a diary strengthens trust more than slogans. Authorities prefer to fragment such stories and pull them into a private context, lowering the political charge. For markets, this is not a news driver, but an indicator: if political cases multiply, institutional uncertainty grows. For international partners, such publications create "background" limitations in negotiations: it is harder to sell an image of stability without questions about rights. Inside elites, this may stimulate caution: if boundaries of the permissible are blurred, it is rational to minimize publicity and strengthen informal guarantees. But informality deteriorates institutional quality and raises the role of personal connections, lowering economic competitiveness. For media and publishers, this is a balance between audience demand and regulatory risk, which directly affects business models. Hidden logic: a struggle for the interpretation of reality: who defines what is considered the norm and what is the exception. This, not the plot, determines the long trajectory of trust in institutions.

The text about memory and those remaining "here" is an attempt to form a moral-legal contour around the topic of political prisoners and systemic errors. For opposition discourse, it is beneficial to fix names and stories to raise the price of repression for the state. For power, the risk is that personalization turns abstract laws into concrete human consequences, lowering public tolerance. In response, the state usually strengthens the "security threat" frame to return the discussion to the realm of fear rather than empathy. For markets, this is reflected via the perception of governance quality: when the state spends political capital on control, it spends less on reform. Institutionally, this widens the gap between formal legality and the public idea of justice, raising long-term conflict potential. For civil society, this is an assembly point, but also a risk point: it is easier to mobilize around memory, but also easier to persecute. Internationally, stories like this become material for reports and pressure, affecting soft power and access to certain partnerships. For business, this creates "context risk" in branding and HR: young employees often evaluate an employer through value conflicts. Hidden logic: a struggle not for the past, but for future boundaries of the permissible, which will determine the investment climate and institutional stability. Memory here is a tool for shaping costs for power's decisions.

Publications from detention often function as nodes of solidarity networks: foundations, legal aid, and media campaigns are built around them. This benefits the movement because it lowers transaction costs of coordination and creates a sustainable audience. For the state, the risk is the emergence of an "antifragile" structure that strengthens from pressure, turning repression into a resource for mobilization. In such conditions, authorities may try to isolate not only people but distribution channels—publishers, platforms, donors. For markets, this raises the risk of regulatory actions in media and tech, especially where content is linked to political topics. Institutionally, this strengthens the importance of legal protection of free speech as an economic factor affecting innovation and talent inflow. For international players, such texts are a convenient signal for assessing political risk without access to internal data. For domestic politics, this creates a dilemma: excessive harshness increases solidarity, softness lowers the deterrent effect. For business, predictability of red lines is important; when they are blurred, compliance costs and operation insurance grow. Hidden logic: conflict transitions to the "information economy," where attention and trust become resources just like money. And whoever manages the infrastructure of trust gains a strategic advantage over the long haul.